




Times of transition are strenuous, but I love 





The Virginia economy is in transition. It is moving slowly away from an economic base dominated by federal 
spending, especially defense spending, to one 
in which value-added private-sector activities, 
entrepreneurial instincts and international 
trade will play increasingly large roles. At 
the same time, it is learning to cope with 
rapid technological change that often features 
labor-saving devices that reduce the demand 
for some kinds of labor, even while they 
increase the demand for other occupations 
and specialties.     
The transition can be exhilarating. Witness the 
economic energy of Northern Virginia, which 
now accounts for approximately 45 percent 
of the value of the Commonwealth’s annual 
output, or the emergence of biotechnology cores 
in Richmond and Prince William County.  
Yet, transition also can be painful. Witness the 
gradual decline in importance of mining and 
textile production in Virginia, or the inability 
of Hampton Roads almost one decade later 
to recover all of the jobs the region lost in the 
Great Recession of 2008. 
The transition process has been confounded 
by economic data sending us contradictory 
signals about our progress. Virginia’s rate 
of unemployment has been falling (good), but 
simultaneously the absolute size of our labor 
force and our labor force participation rate 
have been falling (not so good).  
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Consider as well the somewhat discordant economic growth numbers the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
distributed in September 2016. The BEA informed us that its advance 
estimate of the real (after inflation) rate of growth of the Commonwealth’s 
economy in 2015 was a modest 1.4 percent, even while the rates were a 
hefty 3.7 percent in Hampton Roads and 3.9 percent in Richmond. Growth 
in the Washington/Alexandria/Arlington metropolitan area was a tepid 1.3 
percent and the rest of the state’s metro areas combined for a 1 percent 
contraction. 
These numbers are difficult to interpret. The strong growth in Richmond 
and Hampton Roads would seem to suggest statewide growth above 1.4 
percent, even with the D.C. metro area’s growth at only 1.3 percent. The 
issue is that Northern Virginia (NOVA) accounts for a major share of 
the Virginia economy, but the NOVA metro area definition includes the 
District of Columbia and a good part of the District’s suburbs in Maryland. 
However, the Virginia gross domestic product (GDP) estimates would only 
include the economic activity in Virginia counties and independent cities 
and not the D.C./Alexandria/Arlington region as a whole.1  
Looking at state compensation data, Northern Virginia accounts for 
42 percent, Richmond and Hampton Roads combine for another 35 
percent and the remainder of the metro areas in the Commonwealth 
account for the remaining 23 percent. Using these shares to weight the 
2015 metropolitan GDP growth rates suggests a rate of growth around 
1.9 percent for the state, close to the number released for 2015 GDP 
growth. So, as in recent years, Virginia’s rate of growth remained low in 
2015 largely because growth in Northern Virginia remained weak. 
GDP growth is a headline-grabbing calculation, but it is not without some 
issues. We need to sort out what has been happening across the entire 
economic landscape in the Commonwealth and its metropolitan areas.  
Let’s begin with Graph 1, which presents the annual growth rates for 
real (price-adjusted) GDP for the United States and Virginia since 2007. 
Whereas the prerecession period (2000-2007) was a time of prosperity for 
1  This calculation is nearly identical to the procedure used by the BEA to drill down to metro area GDP 
estimates. For example, Virginia saw a slowdown in finance, insurance and real estate growth in 2015. The 
D.C.-Alexandria-Arlington metro has the highest share of compensation in that industry and, therefore, will 
contract relatively more than Richmond or Hampton Roads. For a full discussion of how metro area GDP is 
estimated, please see: http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/GDPMetro2015.pdf.
the Commonwealth, GDP growth in Virginia since the Great Recession 
has trailed the national growth rate five years in a row.  
In both 2012 and 2014, the gap between the national economic growth 
rate and our state economic growth rate was enormous. 2014 represented 
an economic low point for the Commonwealth. Virginia GDP growth 
was effectively zero (0.02 percent), while the nation grew at 2.4 percent. 
Viewed in this context, the 2016 Q1 real GDP estimate of 1.9 percent for 
the Commonwealth represents a welcome upward trend. The estimate 
for Q2 will be released in early December and we are forecasting growth 
around 1.9 percent again. 
How do we explain Virginia’s lethargic economic growth after the Great 
Recession? A slowdown in federal government spending – which accounts 
for almost 30 percent2 of the Commonwealth’s GDP – is the major culprit. 
This spending comes to Virginia in two major forms: expenditures on 
personnel and contract awards to business firms for construction, supplies 
and services.  
Unfortunately, both the total wages earned by federal government 
personnel in Virginia and the dollar volume of government contracts 
awarded to Virginia firms trended downward between 2010 and 2015 
(see Table 1). So also did the number of active-duty military personnel in 
the Commonwealth; we have at least 25,000 fewer active-duty military 
personnel in Virginia today compared to the turn of the century, and of 
course we have lost their spending as well.    
Transition or not, federal spending continues to be the engine that 
drives the Virginia economy. Northern Virginia (especially Fairfax 
County and Arlington), Norfolk, Newport News and Virginia Beach 
host the lion’s share of the defense-related federal spending in the 
Commonwealth. Federal contracts (both defense and nondefense) 
were responsible for approximately 14 percent of the real gross 
state product in FY 2010, but by FY 2015, that share had receded to 
11 percent. In dollar terms, this represented a momentous $10 billion 
reduction in federal contract activity in Virginia. Federal government 
contract awards and defense contract awards to firms headquartered in 
Virginia peaked in FY 2011 and have been declining ever since.3  
2   So reports the Pew Charitable Trust, “Federal Spending in the States, 2005 to 2014,” March 3, 2016, 
www.pewtrusts.org.
3   The trend is adverse as well. Between FY 2014 and FY 2015, total federal contracts nationally contracted by 
1.4 percent, but in Virginia contracted by 6.3 percent.  
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GRAPH 1
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA ACTUAL AND FORECASTED REAL GDP, 2007-2016-Q2
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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TABLE 1
TOTAL CONTRACT AWARDS FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO FIRMS IN VIRGINIA, 







FY 2010 $13.619 $58.890 $41.017
FY 2011 $13.408 $60,217 $42.873
FY 2012 $13.260 $55.227 $37.865
FY 2013 $12.845 $51.117 $33.454
FY 2014 $12.693 $51.929 $33.673
FY 2015 $12.664 $48.663 $29.612
Source: usaspending.gov and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at 
Old Dominion University
Sequestration: A Primer
Sequestration is a previously obscure legal term that first leaped into the 
public consciousness in 2011. It refers to someone taking legal possession 
of assets until specific debts have been paid. Since the Budget Control Act 
(BCA) of 2011, however, the word sequestration most often is used with 
reference to federal government budget spending caps that are part of 
the BCA. The original BCA reduced estimated baseline federal spending 
by a cumulative $1 trillion between FY 2012 and FY 2021. The reductions 
were equally split between national defense and nondefense discretionary 
expenditures. 
The BCA also established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction 
(JSCDR) with the express intent that it would achieve agreement on 
an additional deficit reduction package of at least $1.2 trillion. As an 
incentive, if agreement was not reached, the BCA mandated further 
across-the-board reductions in total discretionary spending of $1.2 
trillion, once again split evenly between national defense and nondefense 
discretionary expenditures. The BCA also required the president to 
withhold expenditures to achieve the “sequester level” spending caps in 
the event spending exceeded these caps. When the JSCDR failed to reach 
agreement on a deficit reduction package, the president implemented the 
sequester mechanism as required by the BCA in FY 2013.  
The red line in Graph 2 illustrates the sequester level of federal defense 
expenditures. The blue line estimates what expenditures would have been 
without any of the give-and-take just described. The three trapezoids 
above the red line represent sequestration relief – deals, if you will – that 
Congress made with the president since 2011 to alter the terms of the 
BCA. Each of these agreements added some defense spending, but as the 
graph indicates, each also was accompanied by an expiration date. Thus, 
the trapezoids did not constitute permanent spending increases.
The BCA caps, even with revisions, have significantly dampened prospects 
for future increases in defense spending. Even so, Congress has a long-
established appetite for increased spending, with Republicans tending 
to prefer increased defense spending, and Democrats tending to opt 
for increased spending on nondefense-related social and infrastructure 
programs. The two parties may hammer out yet another compromise, 
but this is hardly guaranteed. Further, any deal that might be made will 
result in only marginal changes in the BCA, rather than a wholesale 
abandonment of it.  
When all is said and done, absent the nation entering a war or major 
conflict, the overall outlook for defense spending is hardly sanguine. It is 
defense spending, or lack thereof, that will call much of the economic tune 
in Virginia over the next few years.     
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GRAPH 2
FEDERAL DEFENSE BUDGETS WITH AND WITHOUT SEQUESTRATION, FY 2012 TO FY 2021
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Sectoral Sources of Economic 
Growth in Virginia
Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that a slowdown 
in the economic activity in the government sector (federal, state and 
local) was responsible for shaving 0.6 percent from the 2015 real 
growth rate of Virginia. Graph 3 provides these GDP contribution 
data for the government sector as well as for the other major sectors of 
the economy. Note that manufacturing exercised a negative 2.5 percent 
influence on the state’s growth rate, even while it continues to account for 
9 percent of Virginia’s GDP.  
Somewhat surprising in Graph 3 is the strongly positive contribution of 
agriculture to the Commonwealth’s economic growth in 2015. Relatively 
speaking, agriculture has been declining in importance in Virginia, but 
its impact on the state’s economy in 2015 was considerable. On the other 
hand, mining continued its long-term decline in importance.
Graph 4 takes a longer-range view (2007-2015) and provides a look at 
the change in sector contribution to economic growth across the various 
sectors in the Commonwealth. The information sector and finance 
and insurance have experienced strong recoveries. Agriculture has 
experienced a remarkable turnaround during the recovery period. Mining, 
transportation and warehousing, manufacturing and government all 
remain negative or slightly positive contributors to growth in 2015. So, it 
is possible that structural changes have occurred in these industries. These 
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GRAPH 4
CHANGE IN INDUSTRY SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO POSTRECESSION REAL GDP GROWTH, 2007-2015
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Virginia’s Economy Has Been 
Diversifying, But…
For years, conversations in the Commonwealth have focused on the need 
to diversify the state’s economy away from such strong reliance upon 
government activity and toward the private sector. The truth is that 
the state actually has been doing exactly this for nearly 20 years, albeit 
not as rapidly as some would prefer. Graph 5 illustrates the share of 
the Virginia economy that can be attributed to private industry. Private 
industry’s share of real GDP was only 78 percent in 1997, implying that 
the government was responsible for 22 percent. In 2015, the private-sector 
share had risen to 82 percent. This increase may not seem large, but it 
corresponds to $17 billion in output.  
Still, before we congratulate ourselves for our diversification successes, 
we must recognize that most of the change during this decade can be 
attributed to congressional spending sequestration. Simply put, it was 
imposed on us. The federal government has not been spending as much 
in several areas important to the Virginia economy and it is this decline, 
rather than exuberant private-sector growth, that is primarily responsible 
for the increasing relative importance of our private sector. 
Virginia now has recorded four straight years in which its real rate of 
economic growth has been less than 2 percent. Declining federal spending 
is the primary cause. This leads naturally to a question: Why have the 
federal government spending cuts been so painful for Virginia, but less so 
for most of our neighboring states?  
The story starts with the Great Recession. Graph 5 illustrates how 
the recession disrupted what had been a slow, steady increase in 
private industry’s share of GDP. Between 2006 and 2009, government 
expenditures became a larger share of the Commonwealth’s GDP, as was 
the case during the 2001 recession. Counter-cyclical federal government 
spending in many cases took the place of private-sector expenditures. 
Declining federal spending changed this pattern and put a chill on 
government spending and contracting in Virginia. This quickly translated 
to lower economic growth rates for the Commonwealth. Further, if 
sequestration continues in a meaningful way, then Virginia is quite likely 
to continue in the economic doldrums and experience lower than average 
economic growth rates.
Other states have not felt comparable pain from their contractions 
in federal spending. The major reason is that their private sectors, 
relatively speaking, are stronger than those of Virginia. Graph 6 
reports the private-sector share of gross state product for South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Maryland and Florida from 2012 through 2015. In 
2015, Florida, at 88 percent, had the largest private-sector share. North 
Carolina was a close second at 87 percent, followed by South Carolina at 
85 percent.  
Not only are Florida, North Carolina and South Carolina less dependent 
upon federal spending than Virginia and Maryland, but also their 
economies are growing faster. Virginia and Maryland have tended to be 
“feast or famine” states that boom when federal government spending is 
rising (witness 2000-2006) and suffer when federal government spending 
declines (which describes most of this decade). Table 2 summarizes these 
relationships for the 2012-2015 time period.
TABLE 2
REAL GDP GROWTH 2012-2015 - SELECTED STATES 






2012 0.7% 0.4% 1.8% -0.3% 0.2%
2013 0.2 -0.1 2.3 1.3 1.1
2014 0 1.6 2.6 2.1 2.5
2015 1.4 (33) 1.5 (29) 3.1 (7) 2.7 (10) 1.9 (18)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
12 THE VIRGINIA ECONOMY IN TRANSITION ■
GRAPH 5
PRIVATE-SECTOR SHARE OF GDP IN VIRGINIA, 1997-2015























1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
13
GRAPH 6
PRIVATE SHARE OF GDP FOR SELECTED STATES, 2012-2015
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Labor Market Conditions
Labor market conditions in Virginia continued to improve during 2015. 
Total nonfarm payroll employment expanded by 285,600 jobs, or 1.8 
percent above the 2014 level (see Graph 7). This marked the highest 
number of jobs added annually since 2012. The Commonwealth did add 
jobs in both 2013 and 2014, but at levels that significantly lagged the 
performance of other states and the United States as a whole. Hence, the 
Commonwealth’s 2015 performance was a clear departure from mediocrity 
and a positive sign. 
Graph 8 presents employment growth for the first seven months of 2016 
compared to the same month in 2015. January, February and March were 
characterized by strong job creation in Virginia. However, since March, 
job growth in Virginia has decelerated noticeably. July had one of the 
smallest increases in employment growth in recent history. The data for 
August were better, but taken as a whole, 2016 job growth has been slower 
than expected. This was a contributing reason why Gov. Terry McAuliffe 
reported that the state’s tax collections were trailing forecasts and state 
budgets had to adjust accordingly.      
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GRAPH 7
NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT (TOTAL AND ANNUAL GROWTH), 2007-2015 
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GRAPH 8
TOTAL NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH – 2016 COMPARED TO SAME MONTH 2015
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THE JOB GROWTH REQUIRED TO REDUCE 
VIRGINIA’S RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
We can agree that the more jobs, the better.  However, what constitutes 
strong job growth versus weak job growth? One way to evaluate job growth 
in Virginia would be to ask how much job growth would be needed to 
reduce our unemployment rate by a specific amount. Our July 2016 rate of 
unemployment was 3.7 percent. What magnitude of job growth is required 
to reduce this rate to 3 percent by July 2017? The answer: We would need 
to add a net of 4,858 new jobs each month for another 12 months.  
Graph 9 tells us we were falling well short of generating the new jobs 
required to reduce our state’s unemployment rate to 3 percent. March, 
April and May were well below the 4,858 net jobs goal. However, June, 
July and August were much improved.     
Graph 10 confirms that for many years the rate of unemployment in 
Virginia was lower than that of the entire country. In July 2016, it was 1.2 
percent below the national rate. In general, this has reflected the strength 
of the Virginia economy over time. Even so, one can expect this gap to 
narrow and even disappear if the Virginia economy continues to grow at a 
slower rate than the national economy.  
THE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES OF 
VIRGINIA WORKERS
Another important measure of labor market health is the level of wages 
earned by a typical worker. The good news is that average weekly wages 
per employee in the Commonwealth have been increasing. The average 
weekly wage paid a Virginia worker in 2015 was $918, a 4 percent 
increase over 2014. This easily exceeded the 0.8 percent growth in the 
Consumer Price Index between December 2014 and December 2015, 
so the real incomes and spending power of workers grew. Indeed, since 
the end of the Great Recession, the average weekly wage of a Virginia 
worker has risen 18 percent (from $779.88 to $918.41). It appears as 
if 2016 will continue this trend; wage data through 2016-Q2 show a 
2 percent growth over 2015-Q2.
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Measured unemployment rates are heavily influenced by labor force 
participation. This is because unemployment is measured as a percentage 
of the existing labor force. One is considered to be in the labor force either 
if one already has a job, or does not have a job but is actively seeking one. 
Therefore, individuals who have dropped out of the labor market and are 
no longer seeking employment (for whatever reason) are not counted 
as members of the labor force. This reduces the size of the denominator 
when the rate of unemployment is computed and reduces the measured 
unemployment rate. Paradoxically, this may occur even though the reason 
the individuals dropped out of the labor force was that they could not find 
work.  
Let’s examine recent evidence concerning labor force participation. 
Graph 11 shows the increase in the percentage of adults ages 16-64 
who were not working in selected locations in Virginia. Virginians 
have been dropping out of the labor force at alarming rates, so much 
so that the absolute size of our state’s labor force has been declining 
(see Graph 12).   
What has been driving these adverse labor force participation 
developments? There are five prominent hypotheses that purport to 
explain why labor force participation has been falling in Virginia as well as 
nationally. They are complementary explanations because each may have 
some validity. We will consider each in turn.
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 GRAPH 9
2016 MONTHLY NET EMPLOYMENT CHANGE – TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Jobs Calculator
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GRAPH 11
PERCENT INCREASE IN ADULTS AGES 16-64 NOT WORKING, 2009-2014
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DISCOURAGED WORKERS
This explanation asserts that some people attempt to find a job, but 
cannot, and get frustrated and drop out of the labor force. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) calculates a variety of unemployment rates 
for the United States and individual states that attempt to capture this 
phenomenon. In addition to the conventional “U3” rate of unemployment 
that the media publicize, the BLS also computes a “U6” rate that 
is a broader measure of labor market weakness than the usual U3 
unemployment rate. The U6 rate includes employees who are working 
part time, but would rather work full time, plus discouraged workers who 
have stopped looking for jobs. Because it is much more inclusive, the U6 
rate always exceeds the more common U3 unemployment rate and the gap 
between the two grows rapidly during times of economic recession, when 
discouraged workers multiply in number.  
Graph 13 reports the U6 unemployment rates for the United States 
and Virginia between 2003 and 2016. There is little doubt that the 
discouraged worker effect is real. It is accentuated by what is often 
labeled “structural unemployment” – jobs are available, but those who 
are unemployed either are not qualified to fill them, or they are not in 
the right geographic location to do so. Prospective employees who are 
not qualified to fill available jobs undoubtedly do get discouraged and 
some stop looking.
CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY
Our population is aging and as it ages, one might expect an increasing 
proportion of people to drop out of the labor force because they have ended 
their useful work lives. Until recently, few argued with this supposition. 
However, as Graph 14 demonstrates, the labor force participation rates 
(LFPRs) of more mature individuals have been increasing in recent years. 
Perhaps more mature people find they cannot afford to retire as quickly. 
Whatever the reason, a demographic explanation for falling labor force 
participation rates no longer is persuasive.
GENEROUS SOCIAL SAFETY NET
Some worry that the social safety net has become sufficiently 
generous that it enables people to avoid having to earn income. This 
narrative involves an individual cobbling together some combination of 
unemployment compensation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), food stamps and the like to eke out an existence.  
This explanation reflects a variant of what is termed “moral hazard” – 
negative behavior that can arise when people know they are insured or 
otherwise will be supported in a specific situation. Moral hazard is the 
bane of insurance companies because individuals covered by insurance 
subsequently often take greater risks.  
Is this true for the social safety net? This is not clear. However, we can 
make two social safety net statements with confidence. First, real per 
capita safety net expenditures have been increasing in the United States. 
Second, large differences exist among the states in terms of the social 
safety net benefits they provide their residents.  
With respect to increasing real safety net expenditures, the most rapidly 
growing social benefit is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). However, 
it is paid as a supplement only to individuals who already are working, so 
it does not qualify as a program that discourages work. The second most 
rapidly growing social safety net expenditure is TANF, and here real per 
capita expenditures have approximately tripled between 2000 and 2014.4 It 
could be a factor in declining labor force participation rates.
Differences in state social safety net expenditures might cause people in 
some states to move to more generous states, and some people in those 
states not to seek work. In 2013, in the most generous state, the average 
unemployment insurance benefit was $6,894, whereas it was less than half 
of this ($3,335) in the least generous state. Further, with respect to TANF, 
the proportion of poor families with children who received TANF in 2013 
varied from a low of 3 percent to a high of 61 percent among the states.5 
Clearly, if TANF makes a difference, much would depend upon where one 
resides.
Nevertheless, empirical work suggests that the social safety net hypothesis 
cannot explain more than 10 to 20 percent of the variations in labor force 
participation. It is a political hot button explanation that has only limited 
empirical validity.
4   Catherine Rampell, “The Changing Social Safety Net, in Charts,” The Washington Post (April 8, 2014), 
www.washingtonpost.com.
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5.0% discouraged workers 
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GRAPH 14
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MORE MATURE INDIVIDUALS








National Public Radio reported in 2013 that nearly one in every four 
adults in Hale County, Ala., was receiving a federal disability payment.6 In 
general, an increasing number of adults are successfully claiming disability 
(see Graph 15). This is true for the United States and also for Virginia. 
There is little doubt that this has reduced labor force participation, but 
by itself can explain no more than one-fifth of the recent declines in labor 
force participation that we have observed.
INCREASED RATES OF COLLEGE ATTENDANCE
Until recently, some of the decline in the labor force participation of 
younger adults could be attributed to greater proportions of them 
attending college. This has come to an end, as Graph 16 illustrates. 
Headcount enrollments have been falling in most segments of higher 
education, including, especially, public two-year colleges, though by no 
means at all institutions. 
6   www.npr.org/2013/03/25/175293860/in-one-alabama-county-nearly-1-in-4-working-age-adults-is-on-
disability.
SUMMING UP THE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION RATE EVIDENCE
There is no single explanation capable of elucidating the phenomenon 
of declining labor force participation in the United States or Virginia. 
Quantitatively, the discouraged worker hypothesis (and related structural 
unemployment) appears to be the single most important explanation of 
falling labor force participation, but even after accounting for discouraged 
workers, one can only explain less than half of the changes we have 
observed in recent years. For the Commonwealth, there is also some 
evidence that disability claims are playing an increasing role, but these, 
too, explain just a portion of the labor force contraction.
Plausibly, we must look for additional explanations that extend beyond the 
economic realm where declining labor force participation is concerned. 
Could it be that gradual changes in societal attitudes have occurred such 
that it now is socially more acceptable for many people not to be in the 
labor force, or to work only part time? And further, that laborsaving 
technological change will make such behavior commonplace? We do not 
have room to explore these possibilities here, but they are intriguing topics 
worthy of the attention of government at both the state and federal level.
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
26 THE VIRGINIA ECONOMY IN TRANSITION ■
GRAPH 15
RISING DISABILITY CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA (IN THOUSANDS)
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GRAPH 16
DECLINING COLLEGE HEADCOUNT ENROLLMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011-2014
  





















Headcount enrollment in the Virginia 
Community College System declined 8.3% 
between fall 2012 and fall 2015.
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A Side Point: Where Do Net 
New Jobs Come From?
The employment numbers examined in this chapter all have been “net” 
levels. At the same time, some firms are shedding jobs, while other firms 
are adding jobs either through expansion of existing facilities or by the 
creation of a new firm. The final nonfarm payroll employment numbers 
that we report in this chapter are net jobs after all of such pluses and 
minuses have been taken into consideration.  
As is true in most states, new job creation in Virginia is largely caused 
by the expansion of existing firms. About 75 percent of job creation in 
Virginia comes from the expansion of existing firms.7 
The Commonwealth’s 
Tax Revenue Shortfall
Gov. McAuliffe announced in August that the Commonwealth was not 
collecting the volume of tax revenues forecast for the 2016 fiscal year. To 
the extent that tax revenues are a leading economic indicator, the shortfall 
tells us that Virginia’s economic growth is decelerating. The rather modest 
Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic product growth estimates for 
Virginia in September 2016 (only 1.9 percent) support this notion.  
It might also be true, however, that even though the Commonwealth has 
been gaining jobs overall, simultaneously it has been shedding high-wage 
7   Michael Mazerov and Michael Leachman, “State Job Creation Strategies Often Off Base,” Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, 2016.
jobs and replacing them with low-wage jobs. There is some evidence of this 
in Northern Virginia (see the next chapter). If those who exit the labor 
force are more mature, then when they leave the labor force they take 
their higher wages with them, and less-experienced, lower-wage workers 
are hired in their place.  
Of course, one also could easily argue that the forecasts of 2016 tax 
revenues made sometime in 2015 simply were too high and not properly 
connected to core economic numbers. Hence, the shortfall is the product 
of a forecast that was overly optimistic (which is not an uncommon 
governmental phenomenon).
Drawing upon the governor’s Executive Budget Document, which is 
submitted in December of each year, we can examine the average forecast 
errors made by those who forecast revenues and tax collections. One can 
see in Table 3 that there are several years where U.S. GDP forecasts 
by Virginia staff exceed the actual growth in GDP. This is especially 
true in and around the Great Recession. This did not lead to egregious 
errors, however, in the Commonwealth’s revenue forecasts. During 
the eight-year comparative time span, actual tax revenue collections 
exceeded those forecast by a fraction of a percent.  
Hence, over the past decade there has been no consistent pattern 
of overestimation of state tax revenues. That said, the forecasters 
nonetheless were wide of the mark for FY 2016 and there will be pain 
inflicted as state agencies are forced to reduce their spending.
While the state created 67,000 jobs in 2015, only 
20,000 of those were jobs announced by the 
Virginia Economic Development Partnership.
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TABLE 3
VIRGINIA TAX REVENUE AND U.S. REAL GDP FORECASTS VERSUS ACTUAL, 2006-2015
Year Revenue Forecast Actual Revenues
U.S. Real GDP Growth 
Forecast
U.S. Real GDP Growth
2016 $18,308.9 -- 2.4% --
2015 $16,927.4 $17,735.6 2.5% 2.6%
2014 $16,970.9 $16,411.4 2.1% 2.4%
2013 $16,416.5 $16,684.6 1.7% 1.5%
2012 $15,726.6 $15,846.7 1.7% 2.2%
2011 $14,717.4 $15,040.2 2.2% 1.6%
2010 $13,921.8 $14,219.5 0.4% 2.5%
2009 $15,015.3 $14,315.1 -0.4% -2.8%
2008 $16,087.3 $15,767.0 2.1% -0.3%
Sources: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget and Bureau of Economic Analysis
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A Look at Virginia’s Largest 
Metropolitan Areas
Uneven economic conditions exist across Virginia’s metropolitan regions, 
continuing a postrecession pattern. Some metropolitan areas are doing 
well, while others are struggling. In last year’s report, the only real 
metropolitan bright spots in the Commonwealth were the Richmond and 
Washington, D.C., regions. There are bright spots again this year, but the 
players are different – Richmond and Hampton Roads.  
Table 4 presents real GDP growth rates for eight Virginia metropolitan 
areas between 2008 and 2015. The 2015 GDP economic growth rate 
estimates merit additional discussion. They are “advance estimates” that 
have been generated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA 
is the same agency that is responsible for the national GDP estimates. 
Though we are nearly through 2016, the advance estimates released in 
September 2016 were for 2015, not 2016.  
According to the BEA, Richmond and Hampton Roads performed quite 
well in 2015, growing 3.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. The 
Washington, D.C., metro area saw positive, but slow economic growth (1.3 
percent). Growth in the remainder of the metro areas was flat or down.
The BEA revises the estimates for each year and sometimes their revisions 
are startlingly large. In 2014, for example, the eventual revisions averaged 
1.4 percent in absolute terms – a huge difference when the numbers 
themselves are so small. As a consequence, it usually is better to assess 
metropolitan growth by focusing on longer time periods. The final column 
in Table 4 does this by computing average real economic growth rates for 
the time period 2008-2015. This is more informative than a single year’s 
growth rate.  
The long-term average growth rate numbers in Table 4 are disheartening. 
While the United States has averaged about 2 percent real economic 
growth during this period, only Charlottesville approached 2 percent 
among Virginia’s metro regions. Richmond and Hampton Roads averaged 
1.1 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. This is despite the BEA’s 
estimates that they grew 3.71 percent and 3.89 percent, respectively, in 
2015.  
We fully expect the BEA to revise downward both the Hampton Roads 
and Richmond growth estimates – perhaps even cutting them in half. At 
the same time, it also seems possible that economic growth in Northern 
Virginia may have been underestimated.     
Nonetheless, the overall tenor of the numbers for the eight metropolitan 
regions is discouraging. Between 2008 and 2015, four of the eight 
regions recorded many years of negative economic growth, epitomized 
by Lynchburg and Roanoke, both of which recorded negative economic 
growth rates in six of the eight years covered. Clearly, economic 
progress has not been evenly distributed across the Commonwealth.  
31
TABLE 4
REAL GDP GROWTH, SELECTED VIRGINIA METRO AREAS, 2008-2015
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2009-2015 
Average
Blacksburg -7.20% -3.11% 1.46% 2.97% 7.47% -3.78% 1.61% -0.98% 1.20%
Charlottesville 1.24% -0.19% 3.79% 3.22% 2.69% 0.59% 2.94% -0.26% 1.90%
Harrisonburg -4.64% 9.12% 3.34% -0.91% -0.53% -1.38% 0.21% -2.61% -0.30%
Lynchburg -1.06% -0.45% 1.86% -1.72% -1.49% -0.73% 0.79% -0.64% -0.30%
Richmond 0.00% -0.98% 1.41% -0.06% 0.91% 0.78% 0.62% 3.89% 1.10%
Roanoke -0.52% -1.79% -1.59% -1.01% -0.58% -0.14% 0.36% 0.80% -0.30%
Hampton 
Roads
-0.29% 0.65% -0.16% 0.66% 0.83% 0.28% -0.73% 3.71% 0.70%
Wash DC/
NOVA
2.11% 0.02% 3.29% 1.56% 0.25% -0.55% 0.96% 1.27% 1.00%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Concluding Remarks
If one were to view the Virginia economy as a patient undergoing a 
physical examination because she hasn’t been feeling quite as good as 
she thinks she should, then as economic doctors we would be forced to 
conclude that her maladies have proven difficult to diagnose. This is 
because we are receiving conflicting signals about the Virginia economy. 
Several indicators suggest economic expansion. Unemployment rates have 
been steadily falling and are approaching levels not seen since early 2007. 
Wages have been rising at an average rate of about 2 percent a year during 
the recovery and 2015 saw exceptional wage growth in excess of 4 percent. 
Year-to-date numbers for 2016 (through June) show continued growth of 
2 percent over year-to-date 2015.
Unfortunately, other indicators of the state’s economy are less rosy. 
Virginia’s labor force has been declining in size and its labor force 
participation rates have been declining as well. The state’s labor force 
in July 2016 was essentially the same size as it was in March 2011 and is 
in the midst of a downward trend. The reasons for declining labor force 
participation are not well understood, but one way or another, society ends 
up having to support prime-working-age individuals who drop out of the 
labor force.  
What does the future hold? It appears that Virginia’s economy is 
decelerating – not a fortuitous development, given that it was not 
growing very fast when the current slowdown began. This coincides 
with torpid international economic growth and immediate external 
economic stimulus does not appear to be on the horizon.  
Three of the most important sectors of the economy of the Commonwealth 
relate to defense spending, tourism and the Port of Virginia. All three have 
cooled, albeit for different reasons. One of the few economic bright spots is 
the growth of professional and business services employment in Northern 
Virginia, which we discuss in the next chapter.   
In last year’s report, we forecast that 2015 GDP growth would be 1.33 
percent, and the Commonwealth recorded an actual growth rate of 1.4 
percent. Hence, our model was right on target. At this time last year, 
we also were forecasting 1.98 percent real economic growth for 2016. 
The state’s 2016-Q1 real growth rate of 1.9 percent (though for only one 
quarter) is right in line with this forecast.  
However, since the beginning of 2016, our model has been suggesting 
slower growth in each of the remaining quarters of 2016 and through 
2017. As a consequence, we have revised our 2016 economic growth 
forecast for Virginia downward from 1.98 percent to 1.85 percent 
(Graph 1). We are forecasting national economic growth to pick up in 
the second part of 2016 and outpace the Commonwealth’s growth rate 
through mid-2017.  
Reality in the Commonwealth is that most of the monthly economic data 
reported in the first half of 2016 have been underwhelming. There is little 
reason to believe that real GDP growth in 2016 will differ significantly 
from GDP growth in 2015.
Virginia’s economy will grow in 2016, but less than 2 percent. It will not 
be a memorable year in terms of economic performance. We do forecast 
modest growth continuing into 2017 in employment, housing prices and 
average wages, plus continued improvement in the unemployment rate. 
The problem is that the moderate pace of growth of these indicators will 
not be sufficient to push the Commonwealth’s real GDP growth above 
2 percent.  
A cause for concern is Virginia’s relatively slow growth compared to other 
states. Our 2015 growth rate of 1.4 percent was a major improvement over 
2013 and 2014. Even so, this still placed us only 33rd from the top among 
the 50 states. Seventeen states recorded GDP growth rates of 2 percent or 
higher, with California and Oregon posting growth rates in excess of 
4 percent.  
33
Our ability to change our future depends substantially on the actions of 
those we cannot control – the federal government, the Federal Reserve 
System, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, etc. Even so, 
there are positive steps we can take that over time can move us forward at 
a more rapid rate. These include:
•  making patient strategic investments in research and development, 
particularly in sectors with strong private-sector market demand;
•  improving our educational system K through doctorate;
•  developing new export-oriented markets for Virginia’s products; 
•  diversifying our economic structure; 
•  improving our transportation system; 
•  making competitive economic development efforts to attract new 
businesses or assist those that wish to expand; and 
•  improving our business regulatory climate. 
We are not, after all, helpless actors in a play solely directed by others.
